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Introduction
Lawyers over a certain age will remember Statutes in Force, a collection of brown loose-leaf binders containing copies of Acts of Parliament, thematically arranged by topic rather than year. Launched in 1972 and regularly updated thereafter, it was an attempt to provide an accurate and up-to-date version of all primary legislation in force in the United Kingdom. 1 In practical terms, it was a failure, affected badly by delays in updates being provided, so that it could not be relied upon as an authoritative source of the law as it currently stood. 2 Eventually derided as a white elephant, 3 it
At an early stage of our discussion, we began to wonder how many different criminal offences it was possible for people to commit in England and Wales. Some of us were naive enough to think that it should be easy to discover such a simple thing. In the event, it proved to be the most difficult task we set ourselves. Several years and many hundreds of man and woman hours later, we still do not know, though we can now make a rather better guess than before.
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"Frenzied Law Making"
The lack of any systematic knowledge of the statute book was highlighted more recently when the Independent newspaper, in 2006, published an article which has since been regularly cited by scholars working on criminal law. 12 Entitled "Blair's 'frenzied law making': a new offence for every day spent in office", 13 it claimed an "astonishing tally" of 3023 offences created since May 1997, 1169 by primary legislation and 1854 by secondary legislation.
Were these figures correct? The Attorney-General's office could neither confirm or deny them, being quoted as saying that it had no idea how many offences existed. "There are thousands and thousands." 14 Where exactly the figures came from remains unclear. They were described as having been "uncovered" by Nick Clegg, then home affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democrats. Successive holders of this role -Simon Hughes, Clegg, and Chris Huhne -spent some time pressing government departments to confirm how many criminal offences they had created by legislation, but departments frequently declined to give full answers to Parliamentary questions, claiming that the information requested could only be provided at disproportionate cost. 15 Despite its unclear provenance, the figure of 3023 seems not to have been disputed, and discussion focused instead on its significance. It was taken, for example, as evidence that New Labour had been "seduced by the politics of penal populism"; 16 that the criminal law was seen as "a multi-purpose solution to contemporary social ills"; 17 and a "cost driver" affecting the legal aid budget, the cost to which had been given "scant consideration" when such offences were created. 18 (Commentary, it might be noted, was more common from criminologists than criminal lawyers, who tended to note the figure with a sense of amazement but to be less clear about just what it might mean.) To these complaints, Chris Huhne was later to add the following comments in Parliament:
The extraordinary creation of offences by the Government is massively complicating the job of law enforcement and of the whole criminal justice system. Some of these offences are completely bizarre -for example, the offence of causing a nuclear explosion. The idea that anyone might cause a nuclear explosion without killing anybody, and therefore being subject to a possible charge of murder, is extremely far-fetched. It is perhaps reassuring for some on the Government Benches that were there to be a nuclear explosion that did not kill anyone, the perpetrator could, indeed, be charged. Perhaps more interesting was the Law Commission's decision to head up the document with a disclaimer that "readers should not rely on it without conducting their own research", and its conclusion that there was "no evidence" regarding four purported offences, including allowing a boy under 10 to see a naked mannequin and a woman in Liverpool being "topless in public, except as a clerk in a tropical fish store". 25 If the conclusions of a statutory body established to keep the law under review, 26 with well-qualified staff and a full range of legal research resources, are not to be relied upon by readers, and if that body has to plead "no evidence" when trying to establish whether certain criminal offences do exist or have existed, how is any member of the public expected to be able to establish what the law is and to adhere to its strictures?
The material I have mentioned so far suggests three distinct criticisms which might be made of the criminal law and the practice of criminalisation. The first is that excessive criminalisation has overloaded the criminal justice system. The second is that the criminal law is inaccessible to those A fuller attempt to quantify the scope of the criminal law would necessarily involve a review of primary sources -that is, both primary and secondary legislation -rather than any filtered or edited source. Even that will produce an incomplete picture, because the power to make criminal offences may be delegated to local authorities and regulatory bodies. It is not even clear how many bodies actually have the power to make criminal law. 40 Nevertheless, a review of primary and secondary legislation will produce a significantly more comprehensive account than has been achieved before now. The aim of such an exercise should not be simply -or perhaps even at all -to establish just how many criminal offences there are. As no-one knows how many there should be, that bare figure would be of interest but rather unenlightening. 41 However, systematic analysis of this sort should allow us to understand better what might be referred to as "patterns of criminalisation": for example, how and why is the criminal law used by governments? For what purpose are criminal offences created, how severely may they be punished, and how has this changed over time? Can we say anything meaningful about the content of the criminal law as a whole?
Fiona Leverick and I have been able to carry out such work recently. We have reported this in detail elsewhere, 42 and so I want simply to refer to some of the key findings of that work for present purposes. We canvassed two one-year periods: the first year of the New Labour government elected 42 Chalmers and Leverick, 'Tracking the Creation of Criminal Offences' (n 41). There are particular methodological difficulties in such an exercise, particularly relating to the question of what should be counted as "one" criminal offence, which are discussed in more detail in this paper.
in 1997, and the first year of the Coalition government which took office in 2010. 43 The headline figure is remarkable: in its first year alone, the New Labour government created 1235 offences applicable to England. 44 The Coalition government created 634 such offences in its first year, suggesting that the "gateway" mechanism may have had a salutary effect, particularly as the devolved government in Scotland (where there is no "gateway" mechanism) created offences at a far faster rate over 2010-11. 45 Criminal offences are repealed as well as created, of course. In practical terms, it is more difficult to track repeals than enactments: while it is possible to examine the statute book for a particular year and assess from the face of that material how many criminal offences it creates, it cannot be established how many offences it repealed without significant further research. It will be clear what provisions of earlier statutory material have been repealed, but not whether these were offencecreating ones. However, we did review whether the offences created in 1997-98 remained in force in 2011, and our data suggests that by then, around 60% of the offences created in New Labour's first year were no longer in force. This seems simply to reflect the fact that much legislation is relatively short-lived: regulatory schemes are constantly being updated and replaced.
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This data reveals something else, which is more surprising at first glance. Three of the 1235 offences applicable to England have never been brought into force, including the offence of causing a nuclear explosion 47 -which, as I explained earlier, was given some prominence as evidence of overcriminalisation. The reason for this oddity is that the offence was created in order to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 48 which is not yet itself in force. Because of this, the UK Government has not brought the implementing legislation into force. 49 This example highlights that criminalisation may be driven by external obligations. 50 The majority of criminal offences created in 2010-11 arose from European Union (59%) or international (11%) obligations, with only 30% of offences not implementing some type of supra-national obligation. The fact of such obligations does not in itself render the use of the criminal sanction justified, but may help to explain more clearly why it has been invoked in particular terms. Left to its own devices, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom would have chosen to create a specific offence of causing a nuclear explosion. However, it is easy to understand why the UK would support an international treaty requiring a state to "prohibit and prevent" nuclear explosions "at any place under its jurisdiction or control". 52 Even if it could be claimed that existing criminal offences satisfy this obligation in full (which is doubtful), the creation of a specific criminal offence is a more effective means of demonstrating compliance with this obligation and provides a clearer moral basis for persuading other countries to sign up to the treaty. The suggestion that this offence is "completely bizarre" 53 is, it might be said, completely bizarre.
It might be tempting to assume that much of the criminal law created by legislation each year is somehow trivial and regulatory in nature; the kind of material found in subordinate legislation. That assumption is both right and wrong: most criminal offences are in fact created by statutory instrument (99% in 1997-98 and 86% in 2010-11). However, the majority of criminal offences created in both of the sample years were imprisonable: 65% in 1997-98 and 56% in 2010-11. Statutory instruments are regularly used to create criminal offences punishable by significant periods of imprisonment: there were 22 offences created in 1997-98 and 133 in 2010-11 which carried maximum sentences of five years or more. It might be assumed that the creation of criminal offences carrying lengthy terms of imprisonment should be a matter for Parliamentary consideration rather than ministerial order, but that is not the reality.
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How Rapidly has the Criminal Law Really Grown?
All this is evidence of an important phenomenon, worthy of detailed consideration. But is it a relatively new and growing problem? The belief that criminalisation has increased in recent history seems to be a widely accepted one: it is something that "can scarcely be doubted". 55 A fair representation of the prevailing view may be found in the comments of Victor Tadros, who writes that the goal that "the criminal law as a whole is one that we can have confidence in... is increasingly being set back by the range of trivial offences, obscurely defined and chaotically distinguished, which ensure that the criminal law as a whole is properly treated with suspicion". 56 
Roads, railways and transport 21
Nature conservation (including forestry but excluding animals) 20
Courts and legal services 9
Children 8
Shipping and navigation (including port management) 8
Police (including prisons, private security) 7
The Law Commission's claim that "it is unlikely that the Halsbury volumes devoted to "criminal law" capture all offences created in recent times" is something of an understatement. On the account presented in this table, "criminal law" comprised only just over one percent of all the criminal offences created in a single year. 59 That is a paradoxical claim which I will return to shortly. But at this stage, we should note that it fatally undermines the Law Commission's attempt to use the "criminal law" volumes of Halsbury's Statutes to demonstrate rapid growth in the criminal law. In fact, we have surprisingly little evidence to support the inference that the creation of criminal offences has rapidly increased in recent years, contrary to the assumption that is commonly made. We know that the quantity of legislation produced annually -both secondary and primary, and crudely measured in terms of pages -increased dramatically over the course of the twentieth century, 60 but that does not in itself evidence an increase in the number of criminal offences created.
In fact, some work in progress at the University of Glasgow, 61 reviewing the creation of offences over [1951] [1952] , suggests that the number of criminal offences created during that year is likely to have been higher than the 634 created for England over 2011-12. The creation of regulatory offences in significant numbers is not a modern phenomenon. 62 The claim that the rate at which criminal offences are created has increased in recent decades in the United Kingdom has surprisingly little evidence to support it, and it may simply be untrue.
Understanding the Subject Matter of Criminal Law
I noted the oddity of suggesting that "criminal law" accounted for just over one percent of all criminal offences created in a given year. How can we make sense of this claim? In trying to answer this question, we might begin with some curious comments by Mountifort Longfield -an intriguing character who was simultaneously Dublin's Regius Professor of English and Feudal Law and that same institution's Professor of Political Economy. 63 In giving evidence to a Select Committee on Legal Education in the mid-nineteenth century, he explained his approach to criminal law as follows:
I try to take a two years' course; in the course of two years to go through the body of law, except that I have never lectured on criminal law, not considering it worth calling the attention of students to. There are no fixed principles in it, except that men must not commit certain crimes, and if they do, there are certain punishments.
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Criminal law, on this account, consists simply of everything prohibited by the state under threat of punishment. On this basis, a textbook of criminal law might simply consist of an alphabetical list of crimes and their definitions, and such texts have been written. 65 There is, of course, no doubt that we do now have principles of criminal law which can sensibly be covered in an introductory course for students, 66 even if we might have grave reservations about the state of these principles. 67 Principles are expressed primarily in the general part of the criminal law:
that is, rules applying to more than one crime rather than those setting out the definitions of individual offences. 68 The special part may then be understood as consisting primarily of the definitions of individual offences, but no account of this special part can realistically hope to be comprehensive. Older textbooks adopt straightforward if imperfect limiting devices, such as restricting their coverage only to imprisonable 69 or indictable 70 
offences. More recently, Glanville Williams said in his 1978
Textbook of Criminal Law that "detailed and systematic information about the mass of regulatory offences" was "outside my purview", 71 adopting a more malleable and elusive distinction: how should we decide when something is or is not "regulatory"? 72 Most, if not all, contemporary textbooks dispense with such disclaimers, beginning with a discussion of criminal law's general part before proceeding to a discussion of some specific offences. Few of these books explain why they have examined those offences in particular or even acknowledge the selective nature of their coverage. 73 The honourable exception, unsurprisingly, is Andrew Ashworth's Principles of Criminal Law. 74 Offences which are not included in the special part may, of course, raise questions about, or be illustrative of, general part doctrines such as strict liability or causation, and are frequently referred to in this context. They are not airbrushed out of the picture entirely. The point is only that it is tacitly accepted as sufficient to say little or nothing about the prohibitions which such offences create and the subject-matter which they address.
A fuller account of what is meant by these various categories can be found elsewhere, 80 but for present purposes the key point is that the vast majority of criminal offences are not directed to the public at large. Special capacities can vary in their scope, and might range from being a driver of a motor vehicle or holding a driving license (covering almost three-quarters of the adult population of the United Kingdom) 81 to the other extreme of being Gwynned Council, the only body capable of committing an offence created by a 1998 regulation. 82 As motoring is such a common activity that road traffic offences come close to being directed to the public at large, relatively cursory accounts of road traffic offences do sometimes make it into the more comprehensive criminal law textbooks, 83 but otherwise textbook authors quite legitimately concentrate on those offences where special capacity is not required.
There are many other explanations which might be offered for the normal compass of a criminal law textbook, such as the focus of criminal law study on those issues which feature prominently in appellate decisions, professional requirements (although such requirements may be themselves influenced by traditional approaches to the teaching of criminal law and the scope of textbooks) and a view that certain elements of the special part are better illustrative of the general part than others. None of this is to claim that the narrow focus of a standard criminal law text is wrong. The point is merely that it is surprising that this focus is rarely if ever acknowledged let alone explained -the potential explanations noted here are not offered in practice -and it is unclear to what extent it is a matter of conscious choice as opposed to unconscious evolution in the compass of such texts.
ISCJIS and "Charge Codes": Some Neglected Evidence
Even if special capacity provides a rational basis for criminal law texts focusing on some offences and not others, it does not fully explain why this focus is a justified one. A criminal offence may be incapable of commission other than by a set group of people, but it nevertheless remains a criminal offence, and a basis for the state inflicting hard treatment on an individual.
Some further light may be shed on this issue by an examination of a neglected source: "charge codes" produced for the purpose of ISCJIS, the Integrated Scottish Criminal Justice Information System. ISCJIS is an initiative designed to allow for the electronic exchange of information between different criminal justice agencies. 84 Charge codes provide a mechanism for criminal justice agencies to record specific offences in their systems. This code set is regularly updated, and there is a protocol permitting agencies to request new codes where necessary. A cursory examination of the ISCJIS code set reveals a picture which is rather closer to the textbook accounts of criminal law than to the statute book as a whole. While it still contains a significant number of offences involving special capacity (primarily road traffic and health and safety offences), it is not dominated by them in the same way that the overall criminal statute book would seem to be. As a list of offences, it would be more readily recognised as the "criminal law" by a lay person than any complete list of offences which might be compiled. It is remarkable because it represents the subset of the criminal law which has actually resulted in prosecution in recent years in Scotland, and evidences the extent to which a significant raft of offences never actually trouble the courts.
In broad terms, we may be said to have two types of criminal law, with one being a subset of the other. The first is the entire criminal statute book; 90 the second is the subset of that book which is actually enforced by the criminal justice system. As Nicola Lacey has suggested, we can usefully distinguish between "formal" criminalisation (the law on the books) and "substantive" criminalisation (the law in action). 91 The line between these two types of criminalisation is not a
sharp one, and we should not assume that formal criminalisation does not matter or can be disregarded as far less important than substantive criminalisation. For example, the fact that an offence does not trouble the courts tells us little or nothing about informal interventions by the police, regulatory bodies or other agencies, nor about the steps people take to comply with the criminal law without official intervention. Additionally, criminal offences which are rarely enforced raise significant concerns of potential arbitrariness in the application of the criminal law. As I explained earlier, the modern critique of overcriminalisation has centred on three apparent problems: overuse of the criminal justice system, inaccessibility of the criminal law, and absurdity. Some of these criticisms, however, are overstated. First of all, the critique rests on shaky foundations. The extent -if any -to which the size of the criminal statute book has increased in recent years is unclear. Regulatory criminal law -indeed, an extensive volume of such law -is a longstanding feature of the criminal law and not a new phenomenon. 92 Even if the volume of criminal law has increased, the link between such criminalisation and the work of the criminal justice system is a weak and attenuated one given the extent to which many criminal offences will never be prosecuted. Two caveats are important, however. First, the threat of the criminal sanction remains: this can have a chilling effect on the behaviour of individuals, and the lack of enforcement of any criminal offence does not mean that there are not real social and economic costs associated with its presence on the books. Secondly, the observations here are not intended to make any claim about whether the criminal justice system is in fact being overused, but simply to suggest that if it is this is likely to be for reasons other than the creation of substantial numbers of new offences.
Conclusion: Real and Unreal Problems
I have not sought to explore the question of absurdity in detail here, as it is difficult to examine in the abstract rather than individually in relation to specific provisions. I would suggest only that there is a risk of exaggerating this point. Governments are unlikely to resort arbitrarily to the use of the criminal sanction, and individual examples which may seem perplexing on their face -such as the offence of causing a nuclear explosion -are likely to have a rational explanation when examined further, particularly when the significance of international obligations in criminalisation decisions is recognised. That is not to say that such laws are good laws, necessary laws, or fairly-defined ones. Avoiding absurdity is not much of an achievement.
The problem of accessibility, however, is a rather more real one. I have said less about this here, as my aim has been to dispel particular misconceptions about overcriminalisation, but we have a significant volume of criminal law which is relatively inaccessible, difficult to comprehend, or both, 93 something which is problematic in its own right but worsened by the extremely restrictive approach taken to the defence of mistake of law in the United Kingdom. 94 This presents challenges which are difficult enough for lawyers, let alone lay individuals who are expected to adhere to the law's strictures. The problem of accessibility is not one which is addressed by measures such as the Ministry of Justice's Gateway mechanism which target the quantity rather than the quality of criminal law.
While accessibility is to some degree improved by the developments in the publication of statutory information I mentioned earlier, this is of limited value when the material is organised in such a way as to make it obtainable but difficult to interrogate (due to volume) or comprehend (due to complexity). Moreover, problems of accessibility can only be mitigated rather than removed by any process of decriminalisation which retains a regulatory framework but does not rely on the criminal law for its enforcement. All this presents two clear challenges, which may be noted in conclusion. 
